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To the Editor - 
 
The West African Ebola virus disease (EVD) outbreak was the most extensive and devastating EVD 
outbreak in history. Effective case management is a key component of EVD control, involving the 
care of infectious patients in an environment that limits ongoing transmission. We read with interest 
the recent article by Poliquin et al. “Environmental contamination and persistence of Ebola virus 
RNA in an Ebola Treatment Centre, in Freetown, Sierra Leone”[1], which adds to a small body of 
literature on Ebola viral contamination of clinical settings where EVD patients were managed. The 
authors cite a prior study by Bausch et al, conducted in Uganda [2], as the only previous study in this 
area. However, we are aware of three other studies examining environmental contamination of EVD 
clinical facilities [3-5]. Given how important this issue is for the safety of health workers and 
patients, we would like to highlight this other relevant evidence.  
 
We performed an audit of environmental decontamination practice at Connaught Hospital Ebola 
Holding Unit (EHU), also in Freetown, Sierra Leone, conducted in January 2015 (Youkee et al.) [3]. 
We sampled extensively in a clinical area (EVD Holding Unit Ward-EHU) where EVD patients were 
managed, collecting 173 swabs for evidence of Ebola virus RNA by RT-PCR analysis, using ∑-Virocult 
swabs. Sample collection was temporally related to EHU decontamination, following an EVD-positive 
patient being transferred out to the EVD Treatment Centre (ETU) before admitting a new suspected 
EVD case. We sampled the clinical environment immediately after the departure of EVD patients 
from the bedside prior to cleaning, and then at 30 and 60 minutes after routine decontamination 
with 0.5% chlorine solution according to our protocols, to assess the efficacy of decontamination 
procedures and the effect of time on Ebola Virus RNA persistence. We repeated the process after a 
period of refresher training for hygiene staff.   
 
Our results showed Ebola virus RNA contamination of the immediate patient bedside area and of 
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visibly soiled sites and equipment, prior to decontamination. There was no evidence of 
contamination of environmental surfaces outside the patient’s direct contact area in the ward. We 
demonstrated that routine decontamination procedures reduced evidence of Ebola virus RNA 
contamination at 30 minutes and 60 mins post decontamination, in all but a few locations. The 
patients’ bedframe and floor near the bed were areas where routine decontamination did not 
consistently remove Ebola virus RNA. Similarly, Poliquin et al. reported that bedrails, which were not 
visibly soiled, and concrete floors were areas of Ebola virus RNA persistence [1].  
 
In a further report from Italy, by Puro et al., swabs from the floor under an EVD patient’s bed and 
table were positive for Ebola virus RNA on RT-PCR, following routine cleaning [4]. This was an area 
that had been heavily contaminated with body fluids. Repeat sampling after more extensive cleaning 
was negative, and Vero cell culture of the PCR positive sample was negative. A study at Jui-SL China 
Friendship Hospital, in Sierra Leone, found no evidence of Ebola virus RNA by RT-PCR in swabs taken 
from the clinical area around a convalescent EVD patient [5].  
 
Together, these data inform the important debate on the potential risk to patients of admission to 
EVD clinical areas. In many EVD clinical care facilities, patients who had suspected EVD (not 
confirmed) were managed alongside other suspected and confirmed EVD patients [6]. This was 
largely unavoidable during the West African EVD outbreak, due to the large number of suspected 
cases, delayed diagnostic confirmation, and a shortage of ETU beds, but this raised significant 
concern of nosocomial transmission - that suspected EVD patients who were actually not EVD-
infected could be exposed to Ebola virus during their admission [6, 7]. Our EHU, like others, was 
divided into high and low risk areas, with individual bed spaces. Staff movement was unidirectional 
from low to high risk areas, with decontamination between individual patient contact episodes. 
Regular and vigilant personal and environmental decontamination, together with patient supervision 
to avoid patients physically interacting with each other, were employed to minimise the risk of 
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nosocomial transmission [6]. 
 
Our audit results reassured us that there was a low risk of EVD transmission to patients within that 
environment from fomites or from contact with clinical staff. We conclude that the floor area and 
bedrails in the immediate vicinity of a patient’s bed require extra attention during cleaning. We 
await the results of epidemiological studies looking at nosocomial transmission inside Ebola Holding 
Units, which are also critical to this debate.  
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